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This paper addresses an important question: what can a highly complex public health 
situation such as the Dallas-Fort Worth Ebola outbreak tell us about the use of discretion 
by executive level public administrators? The public administration literature is rich with 
evidence of street-level bureaucratic discretion, but has not explored executive level 
discretion decision making. The authors argue that in highly complex situations of 
uncertainty, such as in the case of the Dallas-Fort Worth regional Ebola emergency 
response, the executive use of discretion translates to decisions under the conditions of 
uncertainty. This article theorizes a logic of uncertainty when two important assumptions 
exist; the situation is absent a plan to guide decision making, and the decision makers lack 
any previous precedent with the situation. Results indicate that when survey respondents 
departed from their emergency management plan, and planned as the event unfolded, they 
were more likely to use executive discretion decision making. 
 
On September 30, 2014, Mr. Eric Duncan, a Liberian native, tested positive for the 
Ebola virus at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, Texas. Two subsequent 
diagnoses of nursing staff occurred at the same hospital during the following month 
(Benning, 2014). The multiple diagnoses in the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) area elevated the 
fear of a national threat as an additional health care worker was admitted for Ebola in a local 
New York City hospital (Neergaard & Caruso, 2014). The immediate emergency response 
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fell to local government officials. In the DFW area, the Dallas County judge, the elected 
official who presides over the county’s five-member commissioners court and has 
administrative and budgetary authority over the county, assumed the leadership role in 
ongoing coordination and decision making in response to this public health crisis (70th 
Legislature State of Texas, 1987). This research suggests that the Ebola crisis in Dallas gave 
rise to the use of executive discretion by public officials operating in high levels of 
uncertainty. Discretion is not limited to the street-level bureaucrat making decisions on 
whether or not to implement the rules. Rather, in high profile and complex public health 
events, such as an Ebola outbreak, executive-level discretion drives and inspires the invention 
of new policy along the way.  
 Due to Ebola’s 21-day incubation period, the Dallas Ebola event evolved into a regional 
issue not easily contained within the boundaries of a single jurisdiction. Cities and counties 
typically rely on localized Emergency Management Plans or Emergency Operations Plans 
(all-hazards plan) to guide the activation of their localized Emergency Operation Centers 
(EOCs), disaster declaration processes, resource management, communications, and other 
functions during an emergency (Webb & Chevreau, 2006). Here, a multi-level response 
ensued, but decision-making and leadership authority remained with Dallas county and the 
city of Dallas at the local level. The county did not pursue a declaration process or file an 
emergency declaration report (Texas Task Force on Infections Preparedness and Disease 
Response 2014), rather it concentrated control of decision making with local public officials. 
The complexity of the Dallas Ebola event, compounded with the involvement of many 
stakeholders, and the enormity of information from federal and state authorities, resulted in 
ongoing adjustments to protocols, standards, and practices as the crisis unfolded (Centers for 
Disease Control, 2014; McCarthy, 2014).  
The literature on discretion is primarily focused on the street-level bureaucrat addressing 
decision making at the managerial level bounded by processes established through routine 
protocols. Street-level bureaucrats rely on discretion, but they still have the rules of the 
organization to follow. They are not necessarily inventing new decisions or public policy. 
Their discretionary decisions are most often bounded by statute. At the executive level, 
discretion as a form of decision making invents and establishes policy. In the Dallas Ebola 
case, having an adopted local plan for an Ebola response would have suggested formal 
planning and, ultimately, leadership under a unified command over a formal incident 
command structure (based on the National Incident Management System). On the contrary, 
Dallas public officials responding to Ebola lacked a formal plan. One respondent in Dallas 
county leadership recalled, “…I have never seen a blueprint for handling Ebola. We could 
not go to a shelf and pull a book off…”  Relative to Dallas’ situation, findings suggested 
communication problems and leadership challenges. Another respondent with county 
leadership stated, “We started with the CDC guidelines for PPE (Personal Protective 
Equipment)… In the first hours, we figured out they were not acceptable.” Still another 
hospital representative remarked, “We were getting information on the fly. Protocol was 
changing from what the Department of State Health Services was putting out…CDC was in 
the hospital…protocol was being modified on the fly.” “We were in the heat of battle. 
Sometimes you have to change. They call it an audible.”1 
These comments illustrate how executive public leaders had to make decisions under the 
																																								 																				
1	Research includes direct quotes from county and city leadership gathered during the 
research process.		
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conditions of uncertainty. The Dallas Ebola event provides an arena for examining decisions 
at the executive level. We argue that there is another level to discretion which we call 
executive discretion. Our article proceeds as follows: First, we examine the literature on 
decision making. We go on to explore discretion as a type of decision-making process and 
we differentiate between management and executive-level discretion. We argue that, while 
we know managers use discretion relative to Lipsky’s (1980) street-level bureaucrat theory, 
their management-level discretion is bound by the parameters of standard operating 
procedures. Our research allows for discretion to also be found at the executive level due to 
the nature of highly complex situations. Our contribution is the evidence of executive 
discretion decision making occurring at the higher managerial level stimulated by complex 
events. Guided by these assumptions, we offer a logic of uncertainty as a context for 
understanding executive-level discretion when government officials are absent a plan or 
previous experience as a reference point to guide a response. Findings from a survey 
administered to emergency management and public health decision makers in the Dallas-Fort 
Worth metroplex provides evidence that executive discretion results when public 
administrators are faced with complex situations absent a plan or previous precedent. While 
it is not possible to show causality, we illustrate the Ebola event itself was driving the 
executive-level discretion. 
 
Decision Making Explained 
Understanding the problem is the first important step in decision making. Two ways of 
examining decision making in public administration is through the lens of programmed and 
non-programmed decisions (Simon, 1960). Categorizing public administration decisions by 
these two concepts helps to differentiate an explanation of managerial and executive decision 
making. A programmed decision is repetitive and routine and is typically guided by roles or 
procedures. Programmed decisions at the management or street level are bound by certain 
operating parameters, such as standard operating procedures. At the executive level, 
programmed decisions are guided by the organization’s strategic plan. With regards to our 
research, any response to an emergency or disaster is procedurally guided by the adopted 
emergency management plan, a subset of the overall strategic plan. Conversely, non-
programmatic decisions are those considered unique or novel.  
The public administration literature is grounded in two additional theories of decision 
making. First, a rational decision-making model suggests that decisions are purposive and 
goal oriented, sequential, analytical, and the selected alternative is based on the ability to 
gather all relevant information. March and Simon (1958) argued that decision makers fall 
short of having access to full and complete information. Their model suggested cognitive 
limitations of individuals to gather all information, bounded rationality (Simon, 1965), and 
therefore, the decision to select an alternative is based on its ability to meet a certain set of 
criteria. They argued for the development of rules and procedures by executives to limit value 
judgments in decision making at lower levels of management. If decision rules are established 
per individual situation, then the rules may be mechanically applied with limited reliance on 
value judgments (March & Simon, 1958). This argument, as explained through the logic of 
consequences, assumes that rational individuals make calculative decisions through a 
systematic analysis of costs and benefits (Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, & Licari, 2011). 
Conversely, Lindblom (1959) extended the development of decision-making models in 
public administration through the concept of incrementalism. Here, decisions made are not 
far from the status quo. Relative to the logic of appropriateness, decisions are guided by 
3
Benavides et al.: Executive Discretion in Decision Making
Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2017
Benavides,	Keyes,	McEntire	&	Carlson                                                                                                                 Logic of Uncertainty	
	
- 6 - 
history, rules, or organizational identities (Frederickson et al., 2011). Due to rational choice 
limitations and the cognitive limits to problem solving, policy decisions are made on the 
margins protecting already garnered political support (Bendor, 2015).  
 
Discretion as a Type of Decision Making 
Early research recognized that discretion was necessary relative to individual citizen 
need and circumstances surrounding public goods and services (Brodkin, 2012). Some 
scholars suggest that certain professional levels lend themselves to the use of discretion more 
than others (Lipsky, 1980; Plant, 2011). We traditionally think about discretion in public 
management from the context of the street-level bureaucrat (Frederickson et al., 2011). The 
action of interpretive decision making is with the lower-level staff who navigate relationships 
with clients of government services (Kosar, 2011). Friedrich (1935) argued that career 
administrators have a base of knowledge in their professional field that provides them with 
some discretion. He stated that public administration evolved to the point that politicians 
could not oversee everything. Further, he argued that discretion was best left to the 
administrator and not the politician. Theories of bureaucracy suggest that rules are not self-
executing (Blau, 1964; Merton, 1968; Simon, 1965), and, therefore, administrators rely on 
the embeddedness of discretion in the rules determining the execution and implementation of 
policy (Hupe, 2013). 
The public administrator, as Lipsky (1980) has shown, tends to invoke discretion 
breaking through barriers to adaptive and flexible decision making. He defined the concept 
of street-level bureaucracy as the discretion in decision making afforded to lower-tiered 
public servants, such as police or social workers, who have daily interactions with citizens in 
the delivery of public services. His theory of client responsiveness argued that the discretion 
of front-line bureaucrats is necessary because these administrators have a better sense of the 
needs of the citizens they serve. He suggested that the complex nature of the work results in 
the street-level bureaucrat’s divergence from adopted policy. Further, he argued that the 
bureaucrat may make decisions that do not result in equal treatment of all clients due to the 
nature of the problem. Public administrators may invoke interpretive decision making relative 
to their relationship with clients.  
Managers may be faced with both programmed and non-programmed decision types 
discussed above. The motivation of the manager to use discretion is based on their expertise 
and knowledge of individualized client needs and a pressure to act when discretion is 
programmed in the standard operating procedures. Even when management invokes the use 
of discretion, decisions by managers are bound by certain parameters, such as standard 
operating procedures.  
The literature is rich with evidence of street-level discretion and behaviors of lower level 
policy divergence (Brodkin & Majmundar, 2010; Dias & Maynard-Moody, 2007; Lindhorst 
& Padgett, 2005; Meyers, Glaser, & Donald, 1998; Rosenthal & Peccei, 2006; Smith & 
Donovan, 2003; Tummers & Rocco, 2015; Wenger & Wilkins, 2009). The autonomy of the 
front-line worker and their potential affiliation with a professional association serves as an 
example of how a cultural identity may guide decision making relative to the logic of 
appropriateness presented above.  
We argue that discretion is not limited to the street-level employee. Discretion is also 
elevated to the level of executive due to the statutory power legitimized in their position. We 
recognize that Meier and O’Toole (2006)	 provide evidence of political and bureaucratic 
discretion. However, their research conceptualizes bureaucratic discretion as decision making 
decentralized to the street level and operationalized as the teacher. Political discretion is 
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operationalized as Latino school board membership. Their evidence suggests that higher 
levels of Latino representation on school boards have a positive effect on Latino student test 
scores and participation in advanced classes. We argue that the authors evidence of executive 
discretion is representative of decision making in a stable, and routine environment. Further, 
school board environments have protocols for decision making and reference points of 
previous situations to guide future decision making. One could argue that their findings infer 
executive discretion, but even with this evidence, school board members cannot act 
independently of the full board. Meier et al. (2007) find evidence of a reactionary 
management style at the top level in environments of uncertainty, but argue that reactionary 
managers typically lack a strategy and rely on cues from regulators on how to set priorities. 
Our research further contributes to the literature on executive discretion because we offer an 
examination of executive-level discretion in a highly uncertain decision environment, such 
as the Dallas Ebola event. Executive discretion in a complex Ebola response is guided by the 
assumptions found in what we term a logic of uncertainty, discussed in more detail below, 
where decision making happens absent a plan or previous experience as a reference point to 
guide the response.  
 
Executive Level Discretion through the Lens of a Highly Complex Public Health Event 
Plant (2011) argues that, while career administrators have a base of knowledge to make 
discretionary decisions, administrative discretion is not entirely autonomous of the political 
official. He contends that responsibility also equates to the role of the politician as responsible 
to their constituency. In this Dallas Ebola event, a judge served as lead emergency manager 
for the county. In some situations, this authority may be delegated. Based on respondent 
input, the mayor of the city maintained a role as public figurehead and delegated all 
programmed emergency management responsibilities to the city’s Director of Emergency 
Management. In the Dallas Ebola event, one member of city leadership indicated, “The mayor 
actually signs a piece of paper and makes me the EMC (emergency manager) in charge.”2 
The elected official is central to policy-making given the nature of their authority 
authorized by voters. The literature settled the debate on the role of the public manager in 
policy making and administration decision making (Nalbandian, 1999; O'Toole Jr, 1987; 
Svara, 1998; Svara, 1999; Svara, 2001). However, the elected official, by their position in the 
organizational chart, is the first line in all policy decisions. Most plans are not official until 
adoption by the governing body. Hupe and Hill (2007) argue that the policy-development 
process is comprised of three clusters of activity. They suggest that the policy process 
includes the formation of policy, the policy’s institutional design, and its implementation. 
The authors explain that these three elements are not mutually exclusive, and the multi-
dimensional structure allows for multiple opportunities for political and administrative 
choices. They go on to say that policy formation is continually legitimized through both the 
executive and administrative authority to make choices on the allocation of public resources. 
Here, decision-making parameters are bound to some degree by a strategic plan.   
Our paper argues that the situation itself requires the executive to use discretion. The 
public administrator’s interpretation of the issue or demand may lead to the use of discretion 
to be responsive (Brodkin, 2012; Jewell, 2007). Relative to our argument, the complexity of 
a response to the Ebola outbreak surfaced the need for interpretation of the issue and problems 
																																								 																				
2	Research includes direct quotes from county and city leadership gathered during the 
research process.	
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as they were presented. Evidence suggests that professional factors influence an 
administrator's decisions as to their course of action in responding to complex needs and 
demands (Hupe, 2013). Certain organizational characteristics may allow a heroic response to 
occur (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). The executive discretion by county and city 
leadership to decide not to issue a declaration of emergency played a role in the emergency 
management response, coordination, and decision-making process. With regards to our 
research, we argue that due to the lack of a clear plan on an Ebola response, an environment 
of uncertainty led to executive-level discretion or on-the-fly decision making. It is also 
possible that the discretionary decision to not issue an emergency declaration provided more 
opportunity for the local executives to maintain control over what appeared to be a 
coordinated response (Kennedy, 2014).  
Executive discretion decision making is founded in authority of the position and the 
situation. First, executive discretion to make decisions under the conditions of uncertainty is 
motivated by the need for a public figurehead in the instance of an emergency or crisis, and 
the high stakes pressure for the protection of the community. Second, executive decision 
making is motivated by the situation, such as leadership void, urgency, risk, fear, lack of 
protocol, or no scientific guidance. The decision-making environment presented by the Dallas 
Ebola event includes mixed messages on medical and safety protocols, a lack of data as 
reference points to guide decision making, local emergency management plans devoid of 
public health response plans relative to Ebola, and an overall lack of professional experience 
with Ebola at the local government level. Executive discretion becomes relevant in situations 
of high uncertainty in the public domain involving multiple actors and multiple 
accountability. Our argument identifies specific responsibilities for decision making at the 
highest level of public management in a complex public health response. Motivations for 
discretion may relate to the executive’s authority to make a decision, and the situation itself, 
here, an Ebola outbreak. Further, it illustrates that executive use of discretion leads to 
decisions which are more likely to be decisions under the conditions of uncertainty absent a 
strategic or emergency plan or lack of historical precedence or experience. Executives are 
able to respond to motives of discretion because they have a better sense of the entirety of the 
organization through their authority and role and have the power to change policy to deal 
with uncertain situations. 
With regards to our research, the absence of a plan, as discussed above, presents a two-
fold problem relative to existing logics on decision making, consequences, and 
appropriateness (See Table 1). First, with regards to the assumptions of the logic of 
consequences, the ability to make a cost-benefit or performance-based decision is incomplete 
in a rational sense due to limited available data on a local U.S. Ebola response. Second, 
relative to the logic of appropriateness, the presence of a first time Ebola outbreak in the 
United States and, more locally, Dallas, Texas, suggests an increased likelihood of the public 
administrator not having any previous history or experience with a public health response to 
this particular disease. Our argument then suggests that a third logic exists with regards to 
decision making in a complex situation. We propose that a logic of uncertainty becomes 
manifest in decision making when neither available data nor a marginal approach will suffice. 
Our logic of uncertainty suggests that executive discretion occurs because decision making 
is not bound by the rules or principles of an existing plan, and that the decision maker lacks 
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Table 1: Comparison of Decision Making Logics 











to status quo 
Information 
processing not 
bound by the 
rules or principles 






Incremental based on 
the knowledge of 
history 
Limited data, no 
existing plan, or 
reference point 
Decision type Decision rules to 
limit value judgment 
Decisions guided by 









Role of public 
administrator 
Apply decision rules 
per individual 
situation 
Apply decision rules 
relative to experience 
and knowledge 





Value Efficiency Effectiveness Economy  
Source: Adapted from text taken from Simon (1965). March and Simon (1958) and Lindblom (1959) with the 
addition of our Logic of Uncertainty 
 
The theoretical models of consequences and appropriateness discussed above have 
advanced conceptually, but current public administration literature lacks empirical evidence 
to know exactly what decision making looks like and the theoretical consistency to know 
under what conditions we use different types of decision making (Bendor, 2015; Meier, 
2015). Based on Simon’s (1965) theory of decision making, managers and lower-level staff 
are bound by certain operating parameters, or rules. Our research is motivated by the 
question, how wide or narrow are the parameters for executives in responding to situations 
when no boundaries can be found. In the Dallas County Ebola event or infectious disease 
response, the evidence suggests the absence of an Ebola emergency response plan. Absent a 
plan, there is also concern relative to what the parameters should be in making a decision. 
Our logic of uncertainty explains and conceptualizes executive discretion in highly complex 
public health situations. Further, our research fills a gap in the literature by providing 
assumptions of executive-discretion decision making in highly complex public health 
situations. The complex and uncertain decision environment exists due to the fact the 
infectious disease was not contained within a single jurisdictional boundary, and the problem-
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solving knowledge and expertise spans across levels of policy makers, management, and 
stakeholders.   
We are aware of the scholarship that has examined decision making in emergency 
management crises that has veered from the pre-formed protocols of the emergency plan due 
to the complexity of the situation, which is also identified in the literature as improvisation 
(Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2007; Kreps, 1991; McEntire, 2007; Mendonca, Beroggi, & 
Wallace, 2001; Wachtendorf, 2004; Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2005; Webb & Chevreau, 
2006). As a disaster unfolds, it may not align with a pre-planned emergency response. 
McEntire et al. (2013) suggest that improvisation is not a departure from the existing plan 
but rather represents activities that improve upon the existing plan. He goes on to argue that 
the word improvisation suggests that in times of uncertainty, actors in the response may make 
decisions different from the original plan. Reasons for improvisation include the complexity 
of the unfolding disaster or low levels of preparedness (Webb & Chevreau, 2006). We argue 
that, in the Dallas Ebola event, information processing was not bound by the rules or 
principles of an existing plan (Table 1). The public administrator wears multiple hats in an 
emergency response and uses discretion, retaining control over decision-making. Some may 
argue that improvisation and discretion are synonymous. We argue that there is in fact a gap 
in the literature where the concept of executive discretion lacks a formal plan and decisions 
are based on limited data, or a reference point.  
 
Executive Discretion through Authority in an Ebola Emergency Response  
Under Texas state law, the elected county judge is the appointed emergency management 
director during an emergency or crisis (70th Legislature State of Texas, 1987). In this case, 
the county and city elected leaders transition temporarily from responsibilities of day-to-day 
government operation assuming an appointed role leading an emergency response that 
typically evolves into an all-hazards collaborative model (McEntire, 2007). However, 
statutorily created laws and ordinances often hinder communication between levels of 
government. The intergovernmental context also becomes a barrier because vertical and 
horizontal layers complicate decision making (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Consistent with 
our argument on programmed decisions, the emergency management plan as a part of the 
strategic plan establishes parameters for decision making. Discretion on the part of the 
executive may occur because of the rigid and top-down structure inherent in bureaucracy; 
decisions cannot always be made jointly in a crisis. Therefore, our conjecture is that the 
executive will invoke executive discretion legitimized in the authority of the statutory role 
thus overcoming barriers in decision making allowing governments to adapt quickly in crises. 
The discretion used by executives under the guise of authority is more likely to lead to 
decisions bound by parameters of the organization’s strategic plan. Executives have the 
leeway to invoke decisions through discretion, but decisions are less likely to be on-the-fly. 
H1: There is a relationship between having an organizational emergency management plan 
during a complex public health response and the likelihood of executive discretion decision 
making. 
 
Executive Discretion through the Situation in an Ebola Emergency Response 
Relative to emergency response by local government officials, local administrators must 
enact a state-mandated “All Hazards Plan.” The concept of Hupe and Hill (2007) is applicable 
here in that the policies of the plan are determined at a state level, a higher level from actual 
on-the-ground execution. There are uncertainties in carrying out the policies, which 
ultimately leads to reliance on discretion (Lipsky, 1980). However, the complexity of the 
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problem, such as responding to an Ebola outbreak, does not fall neatly into one jurisdictional 
boundary and may be further complicated when the infectious disease response is not clearly 
articulated in a pre-existing plan. The situation may surface issues of uncertainty, risk, or 
fear. With the case of the Ebola emergency response in Dallas, there was no precedent in 
which those in charge of the response could base their decisions. An individual becomes in 
charge through their legitimized role of authority. In a crisis or disaster, the discretion of the 
executive public administrator is the key in how the response develops while the crisis 
unfolds. The administrator relies on discretion to make decisions in the face of uncertainty. 
Relative to our research interests, in a complex emergency and rarity of events, such as 
an Ebola outbreak, there is no real likelihood that the city was able to pre-plan before the first 
case was diagnosed. The challenge for the DFW area and administrative leadership was that 
the Ebola emergency was unique and unanticipated. Consistent with Drabek’s (2001) 
research, the city leadership likely resorted to what he termed improvisation. He found 
administrative leadership used authority inherent in the position to control issues related to 
coordination among collaborative stakeholders. However, he also showed evidence that the 
situation led to what he argued as improvisation, or, for our purposes, executive discretion. 
He found evidence of National Guard officers making autonomous decisions on who can and 
cannot return to a disaster site. His term improvisation suggests that, in times of uncertainty, 
the official makes decisions different from the original plan. Reasons for improvisation 
include the complexity of the unfolding disaster or low levels of preparedness (Webb & 
Chevreau, 2006).  
The DFW emergency management plans suggest leaders were well prepared in 
emergency management disasters, but had little pre-planning in the event of Ebola (Texas 
Task Force on Infectious Preparedness Disease and Response, 2014). Consistent with public 
administration literature and the state emergency management plan, we suggest that the 
county judge assumed the role of appointed emergency manager. An emergent collaborative 
evolved, including multiple counties, the hospital that received the first case, fire, police, and 
rescue, as well as non-traditional parties, such as decontamination companies, medical 
associations, and churches. Therefore, the judge used discretion to overcome barriers in 
decision making among members of this emergent collaborative, retaining control of 
decisions and outcomes. We argue that certain situational factors in the Dallas Ebola event 
surfaced the use of discretion which ultimately resulted in executive discretion.  
 
H2: There is a relationship between an organization departing from their existing emergency 
management plan during a complex public health response and the likelihood of executive-
discretion decision making. 
H3: There is a relationship between the extent an organization planned for a complex public 
health response and the likelihood of executive-discretion decision making. 
H4: There is a relationship between organizational limits in expertise during a complex 
public health response and the likelihood of executive-discretion decision making. 
H5: There is a relationship between an identifiable lead during a complex public health 
response and the likelihood of executive-discretion decision making. 
H6:  There is a relationship between the public fear during a complex public health response 
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Methods 
The study relies on a quantitative analysis from a survey of 200 emergency managers 
and public health officials in Dallas-Fort Worth, and the public administration literature on 
decision making and discretion. Survey data was collected in the summer of 2015. The 
purposive sample used in our study was selected based on the invitation individuals on our 
list received to participate in the North Texas Council of Governments’ (NCTCOG) Ebola 
After Action Review meeting on January 15, 2015. Individuals included on this NTCOG’s 
meeting list represented over 50 local agencies within the Dallas-Fort Worth region, 
including city and county governments, as well as the following cooperating state and 
regional agencies: Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS); the North Central 
Texas Trauma Regional Advisory Council (NCTTRAC); and the Texas Division of 
Emergency Management (TDEM). Individuals were asked to participate in this meeting 
because of their position in the highest level of management and the direct role they played 
in the Ebola emergency response or their role as an emergency manager, public administrator, 
first responder, police and fire, emergency medical technician, hospital administrator, or 
public health official in the region.  
The Web-based questionnaire addressing the potential respondent’s perception about 
planning, decision making, leadership, coordination, and the media’s role was distributed to 
all individuals listed on the NCTCOG list. The intent of the survey was to examine the 
perceptions of emergency management and public health professionals relative to their 
response to this particular Ebola outbreak event in the Dallas-Fort Worth region. It is typical 
for executive-level public officials to devolve their power or share it with the highest-ranked 
emergency or public health managers in an emergency response. Our research relies on the 
highest-level manager in the Dallas Ebola event as a proxy for executive leadership. The 
survey addressed individual perceptions of community preparedness for an infectious disease 
outbreak, coordination between the emergency management and public health profession, 
information sharing, leadership, limitations in expertise, and executive-discretion decision 
making. Individuals were self-selected because they chose to attend the NCTCOG Ebola 
After Action Event. The response rate was 52 percent, and the final data set comprised 105 
cases with a final analysis of 85 individuals for whom we have complete data. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 The survey respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed decisions 
they made involved decisions under the conditions of uncertainty, or on-the-fly decision 
making, regarding their organization’s Ebola response. Our survey asked respondents to 
consider quick decision making conceptually as on-the-fly decision making because of its 
colloquial nature. On-the-fly decision making served as a proxy for executive-discretion 
decision making in our survey. Our variable was operationally defined as Executive 
Discretion Decisions. The dichotomous variable measured as 1=Agree decisions were made 
on-the-fly (including strongly agree and agree responses) and 0 = Otherwise was transformed 
from the original ordinal variable based on a 1-5 Likert scale. The executive can use 
discretion, absent of a clear plan in an unconventional crisis.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
 Our research relied on five main predictors for executive discretion in decisions under 
the conditions of uncertainty. For the independent variables, the survey asked respondents 
for knowledge relevant to certain organizational elements that may have occurred during the 
Ebola emergency response. Multiple predictor variables were identified to test the model of 
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executive discretion. First, we argue that the jurisdiction’s emergency management plan 
should have established the decision rules (see Simon (1965)) to guide response and, 
therefore, limit the need for executive discretion. The concept of decision rules is 
operationalized as a measure of the extent to which the respondent agrees their organization 
had an EM plan prior to the Ebola event, Organizational EM Plan. Second, we then argue 
that a highly complex event, such as the Ebola crisis, lends itself to a situation of uncertainty. 
Following the argument of Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003), in a highly complex and 
uncertain situation, public servants may break from decision protocols to meet their personal 
needs. We operationalize conditions of uncertainty through 5 variables, (1) a measure of the 
extent to which the respondent agrees their organization departed from their EM plan, 
Departed from EM Plan (2) a measure of the extent to which the respondent agrees the 
organization planned as the event unfolded, Planned as the Event Unfolded (3) a measure of 
the extent to which the respondent agrees there was an identifiable lead in the event, 
Identifiable Lead in Event (4) a measure of the extent to which the respondent agrees their 
organization faced limitations in expertise relative to an Ebola emergency response, Limited 
Expertise and (5) a measure of the extent to which the respondent agrees that public fear had 
an impact on their response, Public Fear Drove Response. The variables presented above are 




Our model included two control variables, Hours Worked on Ebola Response and 
Gender. The measure for Hours Worked on Ebola Response is a categorical variable which 
is measured as hours worked on the Ebola emergency response during the normal workday. 
The variable is coded as an ordinal variable 1=worked 1-3 hours, 2=worked 4-8 hours, and 
3=worked over 8 hours. The variable for Gender is measured as a dichotomous variable with 
1=male and 0=female. Gender is included to determine if certain characteristics are relevant 
to discretion (Sowa & Selden, 2003), here, decisions under the conditions of uncertainty, or 
executive decision making.  
 
Findings and Discussion 
Table 2 includes the mean, standard deviation, and range for the main variables included 
in the analysis. On average, respondents are more likely to indicate that they relied on 
executive discretion in decisions under the conditions of uncertainty as the Ebola event 
unfolded. As illustrated, the mean for making executive-discretion decisions is 0.543. On 
average, respondents were more likely to indicate having an emergency management plan 
prior to the Ebola response event with a mean of 3.822. More respondents were likely to 
indicate they agree they planned as the event unfolded than those who indicated departing 
from their adopted emergency management plan. On average, respondents were less likely 
to agree there was an identifiable lead agency for the Ebola response with a mean of 2.851. 
Overall, respondents were more likely to indicate that they experienced both limitations with 
expertise during the Ebola response, and that public fear was a major factor driving their 
response. On average, respondents indicated working more than 4 hours during the normal 
work on the Ebola response. Finally, respondents were likely to be male, as indicated by a 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Ebola Survey Responses from Emergency 
Management and Public Health Professionals, Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex 
Variables Mean St Deviation Min Max 
Executive Discretion as Event 
Unfolded .543 .501 0 1 
EM Plan 3.822 1.041 1 5 
Departed from EM Plan 3.1477 1.119 1 5 
Planed as Event Unfolded 4.037 .911 1 5 
Identifiable Lead 2.851 1.388 1 5 
Limitations in Expertise 3.296 1.229 1 5 
Public Fear 4.025 1.049 1 5 
Hours Worked on Ebola 
Response 2.493 .769 1 3 
Gender .667 .476 0 1 
 
Our first hypothesis argues that respondents indicating they had adopted emergency 
management plans prior to the Ebola event decreases the likelihood they will indicate they 
made decisions using executive discretion during the Dallas Ebola emergency response. The 
results of our logistic regression (Table 3) do not support our prediction. The lack of statistical 
support suggests that having an emergency management plan is irrelevant to executive-
discretion decision making in a complex case, such as an Ebola emergency response. 
Importantly, an informal review of emergency management plans for cities located in the 
Dallas-Fort Worth Motorplex revealed a lack of a public health component and no Ebola 
response protocols. This evidence suggests a disconnect between the use of an emergency 
management plan to guide a complex public health response, such as an Ebola emergency 
event.  
Our second hypothesis suggests that, when respondents indicated they departed from 
their emergency management plan during the Ebola response, it increased the likelihood of 
also indicating decisions were made using executive discretion during the Ebola response. 
The findings in Table 3 support our hypothesis. On average, holding all else equal, a one-unit 
increase (scale 1-5) in the respondent indicating they departed from their emergency 
management plan during the Ebola response had a positive and significant relationship with 
the likelihood they would indicate they made decisions using executive discretion throughout 
the Ebola event (β=0.910, ρ<0.05). The predicted probabilities of departing from their 
adopted emergency management plan and making executive-discretion decisions increased 
from 71%, 86%, 93%, 97%, and 98% (scale 1-5) respectively when compared to not making 
executive-discretion decisions. We provide evidence that in highly complex situations, such 
as an emergency Ebola response, executive administrators are more likely engaged in non-
programmed decisions due to the environment of uncertainty. 
One respondent from city leadership shared the insight, “Then there was Bentley the dog 
(the pet of the first Dallas nurse infected with Ebola). We got implicit direction that you are 
not going to get rid of the dog. There was no playbook.” The same respondent also recalled, 
“There were things, the permits we needed to haul away medical waste…not having 
guidance, we just chopped everything up, and it all became medical waste.” In the same 
regard, another respondent from county leadership said, “We had not factored in that there 
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would be waste. That you would need DOT permits to move the waste…there was no CDC 
permit or Dallas County permit to burn the waste.”   
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression on the use of Executive Discretion Decision Making 
  
Coefficient 
Estimates S.E. Exp(B) 
EM Plan -.0431 .293 .958 
Departed from EM Plan .910** .352 2.485 
Planned as Event Unfolded 0.939* .398 2.558 
Identifiable Lead .247 .231 1.281 
Limits in Expertise .229 .282 1.258 
Public Fear -.029 .313 .971 
Hours Worked .786* .396 2.200 
Gender (Male) -.048 .648 .953 
Constant -9.416 3.518 .000 
Pseudo R2 .383   
-2 Log Likelihood 75.914   
Model χ2 21.884   
% Correctly Predicted 68.50%   
*ρ <.05, **ρ < .01, ***ρ < .001       
N=85    
 
Not surprisingly, given the aforementioned quotes from response officials indicating on-
the-fly decision making due to the absence of a plan, no precedence with Ebola response, and 
no scientific guidance, many survey respondents expressed their actions to plan as the event 
unfolded. The third hypothesis of this research suggested that the more respondents agree 
they planned as the event unfolded increases the likelihood that survey respondents would 
also indicate they made decisions under the conditions of uncertainty, or used executive 
discretion, throughout the Ebola emergency response. The findings in Table 3 indicate that 
on average, holding all else equal, a one-unit increase in respondents indicating they planned 
as the event unfolded has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood decisions were 
made using executive discretion during the Ebola response (β=0.939, ρ<0.05).  Given a 
situation without precedent, a plan, or scientific guidance, executive discretion is invoked, 
and decisions are more likely to be made quickly under circumstances of uncertainty. 
 We found no evidence to support our fourth hypothesis that a respondent’s perception 
that they agreed they faced limitations with internal expertise relative to their Ebola response 
resulted in executive-discretion decisions, although our results yield the expected outcome. 
The predicted probability of using executive discretion increases 56%, 61%, 66%, 71%, 76% 
relative to a one-unit increase in agreeing that your organization faced limitations in Ebola 
expertise in the emergency response.  
 Further, we found no evidence to support our fifth hypothesis that having an identifiable 
lead would affect executive-discretion decision making. Similar to Sowa and Seldon (2003), 
an increase in another’s leadership authority would limit the respondent’s perception of the 
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amount of discretion they could exert relative to this issue. Here, the presence of leadership 
did not make a difference in decision-making outcomes, and the probability increased only 
slightly by 20% from 56% to 76% given each unit increase they agreed a leader for the event 
existed (scale 1-5).  
Interestingly, our outcome for public fear, our sixth hypothesis, did not result in the 
expected outcome. We posited that public fear would result in a greater likelihood that 
respondents would make decisions using executive discretion. The probability actually 
decreases from 49% to 46% with each unit increase (scale 1-5) of agreement that public fear 
was a major factor driving their response. Regarding fear, one quote from county leadership 
indicated, “We had to have that trust. We made that decision that night. It’s like any high-
level decision. There is a no-go decision when you are dealing with a disease that could kill 
scores of people.” Similarly, a city leader mentioned, “We asked the Red Cross to just go to 
Olive Garden and get food for the family. We even put a table outside, so you don’t have to 
do anything. You don’t have to go anywhere close. The sheriff set up their command 300 
yards away, and they said we are not getting anywhere near there.” A respondent from city 
leadership indicated, 
 
“We (elected officials) moved them out to this encampment with houses. When we figured 
it out, I turned to a fire department employee or city employee and asked them to go pick 
them up. They asked if they needed HAZMAT suits. I told them no, just go pick them up and 
move them. They were nervous about that. They all have families, spouses, and kids. There is 
a lot of misinformation.” 
 
City leadership mitigated public fear through policy reacting to the first responders. 
 Relative to our control variables, only hours worked had a positive and significant effect 
on the likelihood that respondents would indicate they used executive-discretion decision 
making (β=0.939, ρ<0.05). The probability of respondents indicating decisions were made 
through executive discretion during the Ebola response increased from 69%, 83%, and 91% 
respective of each unit increase in hours worked on Ebola during a normal work day (scale 
1-3) holding all else equal. Again, similar to Sowa and Seldon (2003) findings that certain 
roles with power and authority tend to allow for more front-line use of discretion, we argue 
that the amount of time an individual works over an eight-hour work day may serve as a 
proxy for being in an executive-level role. Further, we argue working longer than an eight-
hour day suggests a salaried employee, likely positioned higher on the organizational chart. 
The findings provide evidence to advance what we know about bureaucratic discretion 
from the front-line street-level bureaucrat to the executive-level leadership. We know that 
executive discretion already exists within authority of the position or role. The findings 
presented here speak to another area where executive discretion may exist within the nature 
of the situation. It finds that executives have a better sense of the entirety of an organization 
and have the power to make policy changes. Based on our logic of uncertainty, decision 
making without a plan or previous precedent requires executive discretion to be present. 
Decision makers are absent any history, rules, or constructs to guide behavior, such as in 
March and Olsen’s (1995) argument for a logic of appropriateness. Moreover, absent a plan 
or data, decision makers are unable to calculate the consequences of their actions, barring 
them from a logic of consequences. Thus, our logic of uncertainty assumes a decision-making 
environment that is one-dimensional, blocking the executive from considering other courses 
of action resulting in executive-discretion decision making. 
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The logic of uncertainty assumes there is no established plan or relevant precedent with 
the situation, thus preventing the ability to interpret based on learned behavior or previous 
experiences. For instance, one city leader indicated, “…at some point we thought the CDC 
was actually going to come in and really take the lead and tell us what to do...the cavalry 
didn’t come. One expert came for a few days, then left and never came back.” The uncertainty 
of some situations at times causes a rethinking of how decisions are normally made under the 
best of circumstances. When decisions are unclear, we tend to look outside the organization 
in hopes that the “cavalry” will come with some optimal solution to our decision problem. In 
the case of the Ebola outbreak, the local executive decision makers expected that cavalry to 
be the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the State of Texas, or some other 
organization. However, in retrospect, it can clearly be seen that a solution to their problem 
could have been found within their own organization. A hospital respondent recalled, “Our 
infectious prevention specialists knew this frontward and backward.” In other words, the 
cavalry was already there – it was just being deployed incorrectly and given a minor role in 
finding workable solutions to unchartered territory. 
 
Conclusion 
Fundamentally, our research examines the prevalence of executive discretion in highly 
complex situations. The discretionary decision making identified in the street-level 
bureaucracy literature is still bound by the rules and protocols of the organization and is not 
necessarily creating new public policy. Discretion is not limited to decisions of whether or 
not to implement the rules. We find evidence that in the highly complex Dallas Ebola event, 
executive-level discretion inspired the invention of new policy as the event unfolded. 
Examples of invented policy include addressing the disposal of the waste, waste transport 
and transfer, feeding those in quarantine, dealing with the potential of infected pets, creating 
and modifying new PPE protocols, and reacting to the unresponsive first responders.  
 We argue executives are more likely to use executive discretion to make decisions in 
environments of uncertainty because they have a better sense of the organization and have 
the power to make policy changes. We contribute to the literature by providing a model for 
examining executive discretion in a complex situation. Considering the existing assumptions 
for decision making supporting a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness, the 
paper argues a logic of uncertainty when decision making occurs without the guidance of a 
plan, data, or previous precedence. Our research findings provide important insight on 
discretionary decision making at the executive level. Executive-discretion decision making 
was influenced by the situation when a plan to respond did not exist.  
Due to the limitations of our sample size, our research faces limitations. Although we 
are unable to show causality, we illustrate the use of executive discretion by public officials 
in highly complex public health events. We recognize these findings preclude our ability to 
generalize beyond the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex Ebola emergency event. Our findings, 
however, illustrate the value of understanding executive discretion. The study presents a 
model for the logic of uncertainty, where our Ebola response research is one example.  
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